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Abstract
We develop a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, changes in investor
sentiment lead to the appearance and collapse of macroeconomic bubbles or pyramid schemes.
We show how these bubbles mitigate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions. During bubbly episodes,
unproductive investors demand bubbles while productive investors supply them. These transfers
of resources improve the eﬃciency at which the economy operates, expanding consumption, the
capital stock and output. When bubbly episodes end, these transfers stop and consumption, the
capital stock and output contract. We characterize the stochastic equilibria of the model and argue
that they provide a natural way of introducing bubble shocks into business cycle models.
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Recent US macroeconomic history has been characterized by large ﬂuctuations in wealth. The top-
left panel of Figure 1 documents this by plotting the ratio of US household and non-proﬁt net worth
to GDP between 1993 and 2010.1 Before 1995, and also towards the end of the sample, net worth
was approximately 3.5 times GDP. Between 1995 and 2009, however, it experienced two episodes
of substantial growth followed by quick collapses. In each of these episodes, net worth grew and fell
by many trillions of dollars in a few years, gaining a year’s worth of GDP before quickly shedding
it again. In each of these episodes, the behavior of net worth largely mirrored the behavior of stock
and real estate prices.2 The ﬁrst episode coincides exactly with the rise and fall of the stock market.
Starting in 1995, the Dow Jones industrial average more than tripled before peaking in January of
2000 and starting to fall: by late 2002, the index had lost 43% of its value. Roughly around this
time, real estate prices began to grow at unprecedented rates and this growth, eventually coupled
with a rebound in stock prices, gave rise to the second episode. Between September of 2000 and the
ﬁrst quarter of 2006, the Case-Shiller index of real estate prices increased by 57,4% before starting
to fall slowly at ﬁrst and much more rapidly after June of 2007. By March of 2009, it had reverted
to its 2000 level.
Much like the US, a decade earlier the Japanese economy also experienced an episode of a large
increase in wealth followed by a quick collapse. The top—right panel of Figure 1 documents this
by plotting the ratio of japanese household and non-proﬁt net worth to GDP between 1983 and
2000.3 Between 1985 and 1989, net worth increased from 4 times GDP to approximately 6 times
GDP before falling rapidly in the subsequent years. As in the US, this behavior largely mirrored
the behavior of stock and real estate prices. Between 1987 and 1990, the Tokyo Stock Price Index
1Data on household and non-proﬁt net worth for the US was obtained from the Flow of Funds at the Federal
Reserve. It is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the value of all assets, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial, and all liabilities at
a particular point in time. Financial assets include deposits, credit market instruments, corporate equities, mutual
fund shares, security credit, life insurance reserves, pension fund reserves, equity in noncorporate business and miscel-
laneous assets. Non-ﬁnancial assets include real estate, equipment and software owned by nonproﬁt organizations and
consumer durable goods. Liabilities include credit market instruments, security credit, trade payables and deferred
and unpaid life insurance premiums.
2Real estate and holdings of corporate equity (direct and indirect) make up roughly 70% of household and non-
proﬁt net worth.
3Data on household and non-proﬁt net worth for Japan was obtained from the Closing Balance Sheet Account at
the Statistics Bureau and the Director-General for Policy Planning of Japan. Assets are divided into ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial assets. Financial assets include currency and deposits, securities other than shares, shares and other
equities, shares, ﬁnancial derivatives, insurance and pension reserves and other ﬁnancial assets. Non-ﬁnancial assets
include produced assets, inventories, ﬁxed assets, tangible non-produced assets, land and ﬁsheries. Liabilities include
loans, ﬁnancial derivatives and other liabilities.
1nearly doubled while land prices nearly tripled in the second half of the 1980s. At its peak in 1990,
the market value of all the land in Japan famously exceeded four times the land value of the United
States. This boom in stock and real estate prices was followed by a bust, and by 1993 the increase
in stock prices had been completely undone while land prices had nearly halved.
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Figure 1
Both in the US and Japan, these ﬂuctuations in wealth were associated with substantial changes
in macroeconomic aggregates. As the bottom panels of Figure 1 show, the growth rates of output,
consumption and the capital stock essentially tracked net worth during both episodes, accelerating
as wealth increased and slowing down when it fell.4,5 All of these episodes ended in economic
4Data on GDP, consumption and investment was obtained from the Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2011). The
capital stock series was constructed from the investment data by applying the perpetual inventory method as in
Caselli (2005).
5For the case of the US during the period 1993-2010, the peak correlations between the growth rates of gdp,
consumption and the capital stock and the growth rate of net worth/gdp equal 0.88, 0.83 and 0.82. For the case of
Japan during the period 1983-2000, these peak correlations equal 0.74, 0.67 and 0.59. These correlations correspond
2recessions as depicted by the shaded bars in Figure 1.6 The US recovered quickly after the end of
its ﬁrst episode, but the same cannot be said of the other two episodes. Nearly four years after the
end of its last episode, US economic growth has still not fully recovered. The case of Japan, where
economic growth has remained consistently low for about two decades, is even more dramatic.
A remarkable feature of these ﬂuctuations in wealth is that it has proved exceedingly diﬃcult
to attribute either one of them to changes in economic fundamentals. Consider ﬁrst the case of
the US. LeRoy (2004) documented that, between 1995 and 2000, the growth in the value of US
equity far exceeded the growth of corporate earnings and of dividends. He also considered and
discarded other popular explanations for the rise in equity values, most notably those based on
demographics and on the valuation of intangible capital. In a similar vein, Shiller (2005) analyzed
and also discarded popular explanations for the run-up in home prices based on the evolution of
demographics, the interest rate and construction costs. Today, these explanations seem even less
plausible because they should also be consistent with the ensuing collapse in prices. Something
similar can be said regarding the japanese case. As LeRoy and Shiller did for the case of the
United States, French and Poterba (1991) analyzed the evolution of japanese stock and real estate
prices during the late 1980s and early 1990s and concluded that they were unlikely to be explained
by fundamentals. Thus, these three episodes are commonly referred to as “bubbles” or “bubbly
episodes”.
But what are these bubbles? What is their origin? Why do they raise output, consumption, and
the capital stock? To address these questions, we need a theory of economic growth with bubbles
and this paper provides one. In this theory, bubbles are viewed as macroeconomic pyramid schemes
that ﬂuctuate in value and cause corresponding ﬂuctuations in wealth. Speciﬁcally, we consider
two idealized asset classes: productive assets or “capital” and pyramid schemes or “bubbles”.
Both assets are used as a store of value or savings vehicle, but they have diﬀerent characteristics.
Capital is costly to produce but it is then useful in production. Bubbles play no role in production,
but initiating them is costless.7 We consider environments with rational, informed and risk neutral
investors that hold only those assets that oﬀer the highest expected return. The theoretical challenge
to a lag of one year in the growth of net worth for the case of the US and to a lag of two or three years in the case
of Japan, which suggests that changes in net worth tend to lead changes in macroeconomic aggregates. All of these
peak correlations are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
6Recession dates for the US correspond to the NBER Business Cycle Reference Dates. Recession dates for Japan
correspond to two consecutive quarters of GDP decline.
7It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd these idealized asset classes in ﬁnancial markets, of course, as existing assets bundle or
package together capital and bubbles.We shall return to this point in section 4.
3is to identify situations in which these investors optimally choose to hold bubbles in their portfolios
and then characterize the macroeconomic consequences of their choice.
Our approach builds on the seminal papers of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985) who developed
a theory of rational bubbles as a remedy to the problem of dynamic ineﬃciency.8 Their argument
is based on the dual role of capital as a productive asset and a store of value. To satisfy the need
for a store of value, economies sometimes accumulate so much capital that the investment required
to sustain it exceeds the income that it produces. This investment is ineﬃcient and lowers the
resources available for consumption. In this situation, bubbles can be both attractive to investors
and feasible from a macroeconomic perspective. For instance, a pyramid scheme that absorbs all
ineﬃcient investments in each period is feasible and its return exceeds that of the investments it
replaces.
The Samuelson-Tirole model provides an elegant and powerful framework to think about bub-
bles. However, the picture that emerges from this theory is hard to reconcile with the episodes in
Figure 1. First, the model features deterministic bubbles that exist from the very beginning of time
and never burst. This is contrary to the observation that, in these episodes, bubbles seem to pop
up and burst. We therefore need a model in which bubbles are transient, that is, a model of bubbly
episodes. Second, and most importantly, in the Samuelson-Tirole model bubbles raise consumption
by reducing ineﬃcient investments. As a result, bubbles slow down capital accumulation and lower
output. Figure 2 shows that bubbly episodes are associated with consumption booms indeed. But
they are also associated with rapid expansions in the capital stock and output. A successful model
of bubbles must come to grips with these correlations.
We overcome these two shortcomings of the Samuelson-Tirole model by introducing investor
sentiment shocks and imperfect ﬁnancial markets into the theory of rational bubbles. Since bubbles
have no intrinsic value, their current size depends on market expectations regarding their future
size, i.e. on “investor sentiment”. Introducing shocks to investor sentiment is therefore crucial
to generate realistic bubble dynamics in the model.9 Introducing ﬁnancial frictions is also crucial
because these create rate-of-return diﬀerentials and allow eﬃcient and ineﬃcient investments to
coexist. Our key observation is then quite simple: bubbles not only reduce ineﬃcient investments,
8Our research is also indebted to previous work on bubbles and economic growth. Saint-Paul (1992), Grossman and
Yanagawa (1993), and King and Ferguson (1993) extend the Samuelson-Tirole model to economies with endogenous
growth due to externalities in capital accumulation. In their models, bubbles slow down the growth rate of the
economy. Olivier (2000) uses a similar model to show how, if tied to R&D ﬁrms, bubbles might foster technological
progress and growth.
9To the best of our knowledge, Weil (1987) was the ﬁrst to consider stochastic bubbles in general equilibrium.
4but also increase eﬃcient ones. In our model, bubbly episodes are booms in consumption and
eﬃcient investments ﬁnanced by a reduction in ineﬃcient investments. If eﬃcient investments
increase enough, bubbly episodes expand the capital stock and output. This turns out to be the
case under a wide range of parameter values.10
To understand these eﬀects of bubbly episodes, it is useful to analyze the set of transfers that
bubbles implement. Remember that a bubble is nothing but a pyramid scheme by which the buyer
surrenders resources today expecting that future buyers will surrender resources to him/her. The
economy enters each period with an initial distribution of bubble owners. Some of these owners
bought their bubbles in earlier periods, while others just created them. When the market for
bubbles opens, on the demand side we ﬁnd investors who cannot obtain a return to investment
above that of bubbles; while on the supply side we ﬁnd consumers and investors who can obtain
a return to investment above that of bubbles. When the market for bubbles clears, resources have
been transferred from ineﬃcient investors to consumers and eﬃcient investors.
A key aspect of the theory is how the distribution of bubble owners is determined. As in the
Samuelson-Tirole model, our economy is populated by overlapping generations that live for two
periods. The young invest and the old consume. The economy enters each period with two types
of bubble owners: the old who acquired bubbles during their youth, and the young who are lucky
enough to create new bubbles. Since the old only consume, bubble creation by eﬃcient young
investors plays a crucial role in our model: it allows them to ﬁnance additional investment by
selling bubbles.
But where is the market for bubbles in real economies? We show that no formal changes to
the theory are required if bubbles are attached to speciﬁc assets like stocks or real estate. Bubbly
episodes are then characterized by high and rising ﬁrm and real estate prices. Young individuals
are nonetheless willing to purchase stocks and real estate in the expectation that their price will
remain high in the future. Some of these individuals are even lucky enough to create new bubbles,
i.e. to increase the size of bubbles attached to existing assets. If some of these young individuals
10The introduction of ﬁnancial frictions also solves an empirical problem of the theory of rational bubbles. Abel et
al. (1989) examined a group of developed economies and found that, in all of them, investment falls short of capital
income. This ﬁnding, which means that the average investment is dynamically eﬃcient, has often been used to argue
that in real economies the conditions for the existence of rational bubbles are not satisﬁed. But this argument is not
quite right. Even if the average investment is dynamically eﬃcient, the economy might contain some dynamically
ineﬃcient investments that could support a bubble. Moreover, it is also possible that an expansionary bubble, by
lowering the return to investment, creates itself the dynamically ineﬃcient investments that support it. Woodford
(1990) and Azariadis and Smith (1993) were, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to show that ﬁnancial frictions
could relax the conditions for the existence of rational bubbles.
5are productive enough to obtain a return above that of bubbles, they can eﬀectively sell them by
borrowing against them in the credit market. Thus, nothing changes when we replace the abstract
market for bubbles with more realistic stock, real estate and credit markets, except that the transfer
of resources towards eﬃcient investment is now carried out in these markets and not in the market
for bubbles.
There has been quite a bit of theoretical interest on bubbles recently. Like our paper, most of
this work has been motivated by recent events in the United States and Japan, and it has focused
on the eﬀects of bubbles in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions: (i) Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2006) and Farhi and Tirole (2011) show that bubbles can be a useful source of liquidity;11 (ii)
Kocherlakota (2009), Martin and Ventura (2011) and Miao and Wang (2011) show that bubbles
can also raise collateral or net worth;12 and (iii) Ventura (2011) shows that bubbles can lower
the cost of capital.13 Unlike these papers, and due to the simplicity of our setup, we are able to
provide a full characterization of all the stochastic equilibria of the model and to show that they
provide a natural way of introducing asset-price shocks into business-cycle models. Finally, there
are two papers that have used rational bubbles to interpret recent macroeconomic developments
more directly: Kraay and Ventura (2007) use a model of bubbles and capital ﬂows to study the
origin and eﬀects of global imbalances, while Martin and Ventura (2011) use a model of bubbles
and the ﬁnancial accelerator to interpret the 2007-08 ﬁnancial crisis and its eﬀects.
There has also been a growing empirical interest on the general relationship between asset
prices and the macroeconomy. This interest has been partly motivated by the development of
macroeconomic models with ﬁnancial frictions, in which asset prices play an important role in
determining the level of ﬁnancial intermediation and economic activity.14 Our theory diﬀers from
these models in that asset prices are not only a channel through which traditional or fundamental
shocks are transmitted, but they are also the source of shocks themselves. Despite this diﬀerence,
our theory is consistent with the main ﬁndings of this empirical literature. First, large movements in
11There is, of course, a long tradition of papers that view ﬁat money as a bubble. Indeed, Samuelson (1958)
adopted this interpretation. For a recent paper that also emphasizes the liquidity-enhancing role of ﬁat money in the
presence of ﬁnancial frictions, see Kiyotaki and Moore (2008).
12Giglio and Severo (2011) study an environment in which physical capital can be used as collateral whereas
intangible capital cannot. They show that this can lead to excessive investment in physical capital, which may make
rational bubbles possible.
13This paper is the closest in spirit to ours. Ventura (2011) models a multi-country world in which ﬁnancial frictions
impede capital ﬂows. In this model, there are many markets for country bubbles. When a bubble appears, the capital
stock falls in the country, but this lowers the price of investment goods and raises the capital stock in the rest of the
world. The paper then uses a few examples to study how shocks are transmitted across countries.
14Here we are referring to the huge macroeconomic literature on the ﬁnancial accelerator that originated with the
seminal contributions by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
6asset prices are fairly common in industrialized economies. An extensive IMF (2003) study on asset
prices in these economies found that, during the postwar period, equity price busts occurred on
average once every 13 years whereas housing busts occurred on average every 20 years. Both equity
and housing price busts entailed signiﬁcant average price declines, of 45 and 30 percent respectively.
Second, there is ample evidence that equity and housing price changes are closely correlated with
— and tend to lead — output growth.15 In industrialized economies, the average equity bust of
the postwar period has been associated with GDP losses of about 4 percent whereas the average
housing bust has been associated with GDP losses of about 8 percent (IMF 2003). Third, there is
mounting evidence based on ﬁrm-level data that asset prices have a direct and independent eﬀect
on investment decisions.16 Gan (2007) analyzed ﬁrm- and loan-level data corresponding to the
late 1990s in Japan in order to quantify the impact of a large decline in asset markets on ﬁrms’
investment decisions. Based on a sample containing all publicly traded manufacturing ﬁrms, he
found that the collapse of land prices had a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on corporate investment.17
More recently, Chaney et al. (2008) have documented similar results for the US economy during
the 1993-2007 period.18
2 The Model
This section develops a model that builds on the seminal contributions of Samuelson (1958), Di-
amond (1965) and Tirole (1985). It introduces two new elements which turn out to be crucial
for the analysis. The ﬁrst one is random creation and destruction of bubbles. The second one is
ﬁnancial frictions. None of these two pieces is new. But their combination creates a novel and quite
suggestive view of the origins and eﬀects of bubbly episodes in real economies.
15See IMF (2000) for a review of the literature that documents these correlations.
16Our theory would also predict that, through this eﬀect on investment, asset prices should aﬀect the misallocation
of resources and hence the dispersion of productivity. Although there is some ﬁrm-level evidence indicating that
misallocation indeed increases during recessions (Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), Kehrig (2011), and Sandleris and
Wright (2010) in the context of the argentine crisis), we are not aware of any evidence that relates this misallocation
to asset prices.
17Speciﬁcally, he found a reduction in the investment rate of 0.8% for every 10% decline in land value. In a related
study, Goyal and Yamada (2004) found that the evolution of stock prices in Japan during the late 1980s and early
1990s also had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate investment.
18Using ﬁrm-level data, they found that a one dollar increase in the value of its real estate leads the average US
corporation to raise its investment by 6 cents. This implies that a drop in real estate prices of 35%, like the one
that has happened in the US since 2006, depresses aggregate investment by more than 5% purely because of ﬁnancial
frictions.
72.1 Setup
Consider an economy inhabited by overlapping generations of young and old. Time starts at t = 0
and then goes on forever. Each generation contains a continuum of individuals of size one, indexed
by i ∈ It. Individuals maximize expected old-age consumption, i.e. Uit = Et {cit+1}; where Uit and
cit+1 are the expected utility and the old-age consumption of individual i of generation t. Individuals
supply one unit of labor when young. Since they care only about old age consumption, individuals
save their entire labor income. Since they are risk-neutral, individuals choose the portfolio that
maximizes the expected return to their savings.
The output of the economy is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function: F (lt,kt) = l1−α
t  kα
t
with α ∈ (0,1), where lt and kt are the labor force and capital stock, respectively. Since the young
have one unit of labor, lt = 1. Markets are competitive and factors of production are paid the value
of their marginal product:
wt = (1 − α)   kα
t and rt = α   kα−1
t , (1)
where wt and rt are the wage and the rental rate, respectively.
The stock of capital in period t + 1 depends on the investment made by generation t during
its youth.19 We assume that some individuals are better at investing than others. In particular, a
fraction ε ∈ [0,1] of the young can produce one unit of capital with one unit of output, while the
rest only have access to an inferior technology that produces δ < 1 units of capital with one unit
of output. We refer to these two types as “productive” and “unproductive” investors, and use Pt
and Ut to denote the sets of productive and unproductive investors in generation t.
At this point, it is customary to assume that the young use all their savings to invest. Those
savings consist of their labor income, which is a constant fraction s ≡ 1 − α of output. If ﬁnancial
markets worked well, productive investors would borrow from unproductive ones and invest on
their behalf. The aggregate investment eﬃciency would be one. A key assumption however is that
a friction in ﬁnancial markets prevents this borrowing altogether and, as a result, unproductive
investors are forced to make their own investments.20 Since all individuals invest the same amount,
19We assume that (i) capital fully depreciates in production; and (ii) the ﬁrst generation found some positive
amount of capital to work with, i.e. k0 > 0.
20To ﬁx ideas, assume that individuals cannot commit to making any future payments due to weak enforcement
institutions. This eﬀectively prevents them from issuing any contingent or non-contingent debts. In section 4, we
shall discuss further the origins and eﬀects of this ﬁnancial friction.
8the average eﬃciency of investment is determined by the population weights of both types of
investors and equals A ≡ ε+(1−ε) δ. With these assumptions, the dynamics of the capital stock
are given by:
kt+1 = A   s   kα
t . (2)
Equation (2) constitutes a very stylized version of a workhorse model of modern macroeconomics.
This model can be extended by adding more sophisticated formulations of preferences and technol-
ogy, various types of shocks, a few market imperfections, and a role for money. Instead, we follow
Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985) and open a market for bubbles or pyramid schemes.
2.2 Equilibrium bubbles
We introduce now a market for bubbles. Unlike capital, bubbles start randomly and without
cost, they do not produce any output and the only reason to purchase them is to resell them
later. Bubbles are akin to pyramid schemes. In a pyramid scheme, any contribution is voluntary
and entitles the contributor to receive next period’s contribution. There are two aspects to such a
scheme that are of interest to us. The creator of the pyramid scheme obtains a windfall, since he/she
receives the ﬁrst contribution without having contributed before. Participants in the scheme (other
than the creator) eﬀectively purchase the right to the next contribution with their own contribution.
These two aspects also deﬁne bubbles. The creator of a bubble obtains a windfall equal to its initial
market price, while individuals that purchase a fraction of this bubble obtain a pro-rata share of
its price next period. A key feature of bubbles is that they do not constitute a promise by the
seller to deliver future payments. Thus, bubbles might be traded even in situations such as the one
considered here in which borrowing is not possible at all.
What does it mean to purchase a bubble? One could think of bubbles as being attached to
speciﬁc objects and, in this case, bubble purchases would entail the physical transfer of these
objects. One could alternatively think of bubbles as a collective memory of past contributions to
pyramid schemes and, in this case, bubble purchases would amount to registering new entries in
this collective memory. Without imposing further structure, however, the theory presented here
is silent on these issues and has implications only for the following aggregates: (i) bt which is the
market price of the portfolio that contains all old bubbles, i.e. already existing before period t or
created by earlier generations; and (ii) bP
t and bU
t which are the market prices of the portfolios that
contain all new bubbles created by productive and unproductive investors respectively, i.e. bubbles
9added in period t or created by generation t.21 To keep the formal analysis as general as possible,
we ﬁrst develop theoretical implications for these aggregates only. In section 4, we impose further
structure and re-interpret bubbles in terms of stock, real estate prices and credit.
This economy does not experience technology or preference shocks, but it displays stochastic













as the realization of the bubble shock
in period t; ht as a history of bubble shocks until period t, i.e. ht = {h0,h1,...,ht}; and Ht as







is an equilibrium bubble if (i) bt + bP
t + bU






t=0 that satisﬁes individual maximization and market clearing for
all t and ht ∈ Ht. As we shall see, equilibrium bubbles exist in our economy under a wide range of
parameter values. We analyze their properties next.
Let us describe ﬁrst how the market for bubbles works.22 On the supply side, there are two types
of bubble owners: the old who acquired bubbles during their youth and the young who are lucky
enough to create new ones. On the demand side, there can only be the young since the old do not
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0 ≤ bt ≤ s   kα
t . (4)
Equation (3) is the aggregate demand for bubbles and follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
portfolio problem of individuals. For bubbles to be attractive to a particular investor, they must
deliver at least the same return as capital. The return to holding the bubble consists of its growth
21Throughout, we assume that there is free disposal of bubbles. This implies that bt ≥ 0, b
P
t ≥ 0 and b
U
t ≥ 0.
22Let bit and b
N
it denote the bubble demanded and created by individual i ∈ It in period t, respectively. We can
write the intertemporal budget constraint of this individual as follows:
cit+1 = rt+1   Ai   (wt + b
N





























10over the holding period. The purchase price of the bubble is bt + bP
t + bU
t , and the selling price is
bt+1. The return to investing on capital equals the rental rate divided by the cost of capital, which
is one for productive investors and δ−1 for unproductive ones. Equation (3) then recognizes that
the marginal buyer of the bubble changes as the bubble grows. If the bubble is small, the marginal
buyer is an unproductive investor and the expected return to the bubble must equal the return to
unproductive investments. If the bubble is large, the marginal buyer is a productive investor and
the expected return to the bubble must be the return to productive investments.23 Equation (4)
imposes the non-negativity constraints on both bubbles and capital. That bubbles must be positive




t ≥ bt +bP
t +bU
t , follows from the non-negativity constraint on the capital stock.
One can summarize this discussion by saying that the theory imposes two restrictions on the
type of bubbles that can exist. On the one hand, bubbles must grow fast enough or otherwise the
young will not be willing to purchase them. This restriction is embedded in Equation (3). On the
other hand, the aggregate bubble cannot grow too fast or otherwise the young will not be able
to purchase them. This restriction is embedded in Equation (4). The tension between these two
restrictions is what determines the set of equilibrium bubbles, as we show in section 3.
The presence of a market for bubbles has potentially important macroeconomic eﬀects that
work through capital accumulation. To see this, we ﬁrst derive the dynamics of the capital stock





A   s   kα
t + (1 − δ)   bP
t − δ   bt if
bt + bP
t
(1 − ε)   s   kα
t
< 1
s   kα
t − bt if
bt + bP
t




Equation (5) has two steps that depend on who is the marginal buyer of the bubble. When the
bubble is small, the marginal buyer is an unproductive investor. In this case, capital accumulation
equals the savings of the productive investors times their eﬃciency (which is one), i.e. ε s kα
t +bP
t ;
plus the savings of the unproductive investors minus the value of the bubbles they purchase times
their eﬃciency (which is δ), i.e. δ  
 
(1 − ε)   s   kα
t + bU




. When the bubble is large,
the marginal buyer is a productive investor. In this case, unproductive investors do not build
capital and capital accumulation equals the savings of the productive investors i.e. ε   s   kα
t + bP
t ;
23Bubbles cannot deliver a higher return than productive investments. Asssume this were the case. Then, nobody
would invest and the return to investment would be inﬁnite. But this means that the bubble would be growing at an
inﬁnite rate and this is not possible.
11minus the bubbles they purchase, i.e. bt + bP
t + bU
t − (1 − ε)   s   kα
t − bU
t .
Equation (5) nicely illustrates the two macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbles. The ﬁrst one is
the classic crowding-out eﬀect: when the old sell bubbles to the young, consumption grows and
investment falls. This is why bt slows down capital accumulation. Interestingly, the bubble crowds
out ﬁrst unproductive investments. It is only when there are no unproductive investments left that
the bubble starts to crowd out productive investments. This ability of the bubble to eliminate the
‘right’ investments raises average investment eﬃciency and minimizes this crowding-out eﬀect. The
second macroeconomic eﬀect of bubbles is a new reallocation eﬀect: when the productive young sell
bubbles to the unproductive young, productive investments replace unproductive ones. This eﬀect
further raises average investment eﬃciency and explains why bP
t speeds up capital accumulation.
The relative magnitudes of these two eﬀects is unclear at this point since we do not know the
relative size of bt and bP
t . We return to this issue in section 3.












t=0 satisfying Equations (3), (4) and (5) for all t and ht ∈ Ht.
The “fundamental” equilibrium described in the previous subsection corresponds to the particular








t=0 for all t and ht ∈ Ht.
This equilibrium always exists, but there are no ‘a priori’ reasons for choosing it. Nonetheless, this
is the equilibrium macroeconomics has focused on almost exclusively.
At this point, it is useful to explain how our model diﬀers from (and what it adds to) the
original models of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985). Unlike us, both Samuelson and Tirole
restricted their analysis to the subset of equilibria that are deterministic and do not involve bubble
creation or destruction. That is, they imposed the additional restrictions that Etbt+1 = bt+1 and
bP
t = bNU
t = 0 for all t and ht ∈ Ht. With these restrictions, any bubble must have existed from
the very beginning of time and it can never burst, i.e. its value can never be zero. This makes
their models unsuitable to study the type of episodes that interest us. We therefore relax these
restrictions here and allow for stochastic equilibria with bubble creation. Unlike us, both Samuelson
and Tirole assumed that ﬁnancial markets are frictionless. Since this allows productive investors to
invest on behalf of unproductive ones, this is akin to imposing the additional restriction that δ = 1.
With this restriction, bubbles only have crowding-out eﬀects and slow down capital accumulation.
This makes their models inconsistent with the empirical evidence that bubbly episodes tend to speed
up capital accumulation. We therefore introduce ﬁnancial frictions and allow for the possibility that
bubbles be expansionary.
123 Bubbly episodes and their macroeconomic eﬀects
An important payoﬀ of analyzing stochastic equilibria with bubble creation and destruction is that
this allows us to rigorously capture the notion of a bubbly episode. Within a given history, the
economy generically ﬂuctuates between periods in which bt + bP
t + bU
t = 0 and periods in which
bt +bP
t +bU
t > 0. We say that the economy is in the fundamental state if bt +bP
t +bU
t = 0. We say
instead that the economy is experiencing a bubbly episode if bt + bP
t + bU
t > 0. A bubbly episode
starts when the economy leaves the fundamental state and ends when the economy returns to the
fundamental state. We study next the nature of bubbly episodes and their macroeconomic eﬀects.
3.1 Existence of bubbles
To study the types of bubble that can occur in equilibrium, it is useful to exploit a trick that makes
the model recursive. Let xt, xP
t and xU
t be the stock of old and new bubbles as a share of the
savings of the young or wealth of the economy, i.e. xt ≡
bt












s   kα
t
. Then,
we can rewrite Equations (3) and (4) as saying that, if xt + xP
t + xU
t > 0, then
Etxt+1

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0 ≤ xt ≤ 1. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) fully describe the bubble dynamics that can take place in our economy. There
are two sources of randomness in these dynamics: shocks to bubble creation, i.e. xP
t and xU
t ; and









t=0 satisfying Equations (6) and (7) is an equilibrium bubble.
The following proposition provides the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes:
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if A ≤ 1 − ε
.






t=0  = {0,0,0}
∞
t=0
that satisfy Equation (6), there is at least one that also satisﬁes Equation (7). Consider ﬁrst the
13case in which there is no bubble creation after a bubbly episode starts. Figure 2 plots Etxt+1






t = 0 for all t > t0, where t0 is




slope of Etxt+1 at the origin is greater than or equal to one. This means that any initial bubble
would be demanded only if it were expected to continuously grow as a share of labor income, i.e.
if it violates Equation (7), and this can be ruled out. The right panel of Figure 2 shows the case in
which α < s 
A
δ
. Now the slope of Etxt+1 at the origin is less than one and, as a result, Etxt+1 must
cross the 45 degree line once and only once. Let x∗ be the value of xt at that point. Any initial
bubble xt0+1 > x∗ can be ruled out. But any initial bubble xN
t0 ≤ x∗ can be part of an equilibrium







Is it possible that bubble creation relaxes the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes?
The answer is negative if we consider bubble creation by unproductive investors, i.e. xU
t . To see
this, note that bubble creation shifts upwards the schedule Etxt+1 in Figure 2. The intuition is
clear: new bubbles compete with old bubbles for the income of next period’s young, reducing their
return and making them less attractive.
Consider next bubble creation by productive investors, i.e. xP
t . Equation (6) shows that this
type of bubble creation shifts the schedule Etxt+1 upwards if xt ∈ (0,A]∪(1 − ε,1], but it shifts it
downwards if xt ∈ (A,1 − ε]. To understand this result, it is important to recognize the double role
played by bubble creation by productive investors. On the one hand, new bubbles compete with
old ones for the income of next period’s young. This eﬀect reduces the demand for old bubbles
and shifts the schedule Etxt+1 upwards. On the other hand, productive investors sell new bubbles
14to unproductive investors and use the proceeds to invest, raising average investment eﬃciency and
the income of next period’s young. This eﬀect increases the demand for old bubbles and shifts the
schedule Etxt+1 downwards. This second eﬀect operates whenever xt ≤ 1 − ε, and it dominates
the ﬁrst eﬀect only if xt ≥ A. Hence, if A > 1 − ε, bubble creation by productive investors cannot
relax the condition for the existence of bubbly episodes.
If A ≤ 1−ε, bubble creation does relax the condition for the existence of bubbles. Namely, this







4   (1 − ε)   A
 
. Figure 3 provides some intuition for this
result by plotting Etxt+1 against xt, using Equation (6) and assuming that xU






0 if xt ∈ (0,A] ∪ (1 − ε,1]
1 − ε − xt if xt ∈ (A,1 − ε]
,
for all t > t0. In both panels, this bubble creation by productive investors shifts the schedule Etxt+1
downward. The left panel shows the case in which this does not not aﬀect the conditions for the
existence of bubbly episodes, i.e. 4   (1 − ε)   A > 1. The right panel shows instead the case in
which bubble creation by productive investors weakens the conditions for the existence of bubbly









Proposition 1 provides the condition for existence of bubbly episodes of any sort. It is also
useful to describe the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes according to their eﬀects on
capital accumulation. Recall that these eﬀects depend on whether xP




. We label a bubbly episode as contractionary if xP




15We similarly label a bubbly episode as expansionary if xP




With these deﬁnitions at hand, we can state the following proposition:











(1 − δ) if A > 0.5
1
4   (1 − ε)   A
if A ≤ 0.5
.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows almost immediately from the proof of Proposition 1 and we













Bubbly episodes are possible in Regions II-IV, but not in Region I. In Regions II and III, α < αC
and contractionary episodes are possible. In Region III and IV, α < αE and expansionary episodes
are possible. In the limiting case δ → 1, only contractionary episodes are possible. As δ declines,
the value of α required for the existence of both types of bubbly episodes declines. In the limiting
case δ → 0, both types of bubbly episodes are possible regardless of α.
24Some bubbly episodes are neither contractionary nor expansionary according to these deﬁnitions since their eﬀects
on the capital stock and output vary through time within a given history.
25Figure 4 has been drawn for a ﬁxed value of ε < 0.5. This guarantees that Region IV exists.
163.2 Bubbles and dynamic ineﬃciency
During a bubbly episode, the young reduce their investments and purchase bubbles. They do so
voluntarily in the expectation that the revenues from selling these bubbles will exceed the foregone
investment income. These revenues are nothing but the reduction in the investments of the next
generation of young minus the value of any new bubbles. Thus, bubbly episodes are possible if
there exists a chain of investments that is expected to absorb resources, that is, a chain whose cost
is expected to exceed the income it produces in all periods. More formally, let It be a chain of
investments and let Dt be the resources it absorbs. This chain is expected to absorb resources in
all periods if, for all t,
Et {It+1 − Rt+1   It} = Et{Dt+1} ≥ 0, (8)
where Rt+1 is the equilibrium return to the investments in the chain. We say that a chain is
“dynamically ineﬃcient” if it satisﬁes Equation (8). We provide next the economic intuition behind
Propositions 1 and 2 by showing that bubbles can exist if the chains of investments they replace
are dynamically ineﬃcient at the equilibrium return to investment. Intuitively, investors are happy
not to make these investments and instead purchase bubbles or pyramid schemes. The latter can
oﬀer as much as Et{It+1}, while the investments can only oﬀer Et {Rt+1   It}. We emphasize that
Condition (8) must be evaluated at the equilibrium rate of return because this observation plays a
subtle but crucial role in what follows: a chain of investments might not be dynamically ineﬃcient
in the fundamental or other equilibria, and yet this same chain might be dynamically ineﬃcient in
the equilibrium in which the bubble replaces it. It is the latter that is required for a bubbly episode
to exist.
In the proof of Proposition 1, we began by considering bubbly episodes in which there is no
bubble creation after their start. To determine whether these episodes are possible, we must
simply check whether there exist dynamically ineﬃcient chains of investments to be replaced, i.e.
satisfying Condition (8) for some Dt ≥ 0. Since it is easier to construct dynamically ineﬃcient
chains of unproductive investments, we take a chain of such investments It = xt   s   kα
t . Since
the equilibrium rate of return to unproductive investments is Rt = δ   α   kα−1
t , this chain satisﬁes
Condition (8) if and only if
Etxt+1   s   kα
t+1 ≥ δ   α   kα−1
t+1   xt   s   kα
t =
xt   δ
A − δ   xt
  α   kα
t+1 ≥ 0, (9)
17for all t.26 The LHS of Condition (9) is Et {It+1} while the RHS is Et {Rt+1   It}. A chain of
investments can satisfy Condition (9) if and only if




Otherwise xt would have to grow continuously and eventually exceed one, which is not possible.
But this is the condition for the existence of bubbly episodes without bubble creation that we found
in the proof of Proposition 1. Since these episodes are all contractionary, this is also the condition
for being in regions II and III of Figure 4.
We then asked whether bubble creation could relax the conditions for bubbly episodes to exist.
At ﬁrst sight, one might be tempted to dismiss this possibility at once. With bubble creation,
bubbles replace chains of investment that absorb a strictly positive amount of resources, i.e. Dt > 0;
and this seems to make Condition (8) more stringent. But this reasoning is incomplete because
it fails to recognize that Condition (8) must be evaluated at the equilibrium rate of return, which
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  s   kα
t . Since
the equilibrium rate of return to unproductive investments is Rt = δ   α   kα−1
t , this chain satisﬁes
Condition (8) if and only if
Etxt+1   s   kα















A + (1 − δ)   xP
t − δ   xt
  α   kα
t+1, (10)
for all t. The LHS of Condition (10) is Et {It+1 − Dt+1} while the RHS is Et {Rt+1   It}. A chain
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if A ≤ 1 − ε
.
Otherwise xt would have to grow continuously and eventually exceed one, which is not possible.
But this is the condition for the existence of bubbles in Proposition 1. It is also the condition for
being in regions II-IV of Figure 4. Bubble creation thus makes the bubbly episodes of region IV
possible. In these episodes, bubbles lower the rate of return making the chains of investments they
replace dynamically ineﬃcient.
26Here we have used Equation (5) and the deﬁnition of xt to eliminate kt.
18We end this discussion by noting that the special case in which investments are homogenous
and ﬁnancial frictions are irrelevant, i.e. δ = 1, exhibits an interesting property: if there exists
a dynamically ineﬃcient chain of investments, then the chain of all investments must also be
dynamically ineﬃcient. This is because all investments are homogenous.27 Thus, the condition
for bubbly episodes to exist implies that aggregate investment exceeds capital income, i.e. α < s.
Abel et al. (1989) used this result to call into doubt the existence of rational bubbly episodes in
industrial economies, since in all of them aggregate investment falls short of capital income.
Our analysis shows that this reasoning is based on the dubious assumption that ﬁnancial frictions
do not matter in industrial economies. If δ < 1, we have shown that rational bubbly episodes are
possible even if α > s. This is for two reasons: (i) if s < α < s  
A
δ
(regions II and III), in the









4   (1 − ε)   A
(region IV), there are no dynamically ineﬃcient chains of investment in the
fundamental state but expansionary bubbly episodes that lower the return to investment would
create such chains themselves.28
3.3 Shocks to investor sentiment as a source of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
We study next the macroeconomic eﬀects of bubbly episodes. To do this, rewrite the law of motion
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t=0  = {0,0,0}
∞
t=0 satisfying Equations (6) and (7). Interestingly, bubbly
episodes can be literally interpreted as shocks to the law of motion of the capital stock. These
shocks do not reﬂect any fundamental change in preferences and technology. Instead, they can
27Once again, we note that the chain that contains all investments in the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient in
equilibria in which bubbles do not replace all investments. There exists no equilibrium in which all investments are
replaced by bubbles.
28This discussion provides a sense of how the ﬁnancial friction relaxes the condition for the existence of bubbly
episodes. The constraint that the ﬁnancial friction imposes on the reallocation of resources must be tight enough to
(i) make the unproductive investments ineﬃcient in the fundamental state, or to; (ii) make the gains from realloca-
tion suﬃciently high, and hence bubble creation suﬃciently expansionary, to render the unproductive investments
ineﬃcient in the bubbly state. This does not necessarily require the ﬁnancial friction to prevent all intermediation.
See, for instance, Martin and Ventura (2011).
19aptly be described as shocks to investor sentiment.
These shocks also have independent eﬀects on consumption and therefore welfare, which in this
model happen to be exactly the same:
ct = (α + xt   s)   kα
t . (12)
Equation (12) shows how bubbles aﬀect consumption through two channels. First, contemporary
bubbles increase consumption by raising the share of output in the hands of the old. This ﬁrst
eﬀect is the same for all bubbly episodes, regardless of their type. Second, past bubbles aﬀect
consumption through their eﬀect on the contemporary capital stock. This second eﬀect clearly
depends on the type of bubbly episode. In contractionary bubbly episodes, it lowers the capital stock
and consumption. In expansionary bubbly episodes, it raises the capital stock and consumption.
To illustrate the potential of investor sentiment shocks for business cycle theory, we use next a
particular example. Let zt ∈ {F,B} be a random variable that determines whether the econ-
omy is in a fundamental state or in a bubbly episode, where Pr[zt+1 = B/zt = F] = q and
Pr[zt+1 = F/zt = B] = p for all t. That is, the economy switches between the fundamental state
and bubbly episodes with transition probabilities q and p. When the economy is in the fundamental
state, i.e. zt = F, we have that xP
t = xU
t = xt = 0. When the economy is in a bubbly episode, i.e.
zt = B, we have that:
xP
t = η0+η1 xt, xU
t = 0, and xt =
α
s   (1 − p)
 
δ   [(1 + η1)   xt + η0]






σ with prob. 0.5
−σ with prob. 0.5
. Thus, Etut+1 = 0 and Etu2
t+1 = σ2. In this speciﬁc example,
bubble shocks are driven by two components describing diﬀerent aspects of investor sentiment.
While ut embodies small changes in investor sentiment that lead to ﬂuctuations in the bubble
within a bubbly episode, zt embodies drastic changes in investor sentiment that start and end
bubbly episodes.
Figure 6 shows the result of simulating the economy using this example.29 The ﬁgure plots
output (kα
t ), consumption (ct) and the bubble (bt +bP
t +bU
t ) in each period. Initially, the economy
29To produce this ﬁgure, we assume that p = 0.11, q = 0.11, η0 = 0.15, η1 = 0.18, δ = 0.1, σ = 0.035, ε = 0.02





< 1; and bubbly episodes are always expansionary, i.e. x
P




20is in the fundamental steady state. In period 15, there is a shock to investor sentiment that fuels
a bubbly episode and raises the eﬃciency of investment. Consequently, the law of motion of the
capital stock shifts upwards and the economy starts transitioning towards a higher, bubbly, steady
state. Output and consumption increase, although they ﬂuctuate throughout the bubbly episode
along with the bubble. In period 35, a shock to investor sentiment ends this ﬁrst episode and
the economy suﬀers a sharp contraction. Output and consumption collapse and they stabilize
around the fundamental steady state. Only 6 periods later, there is another shock to investor
sentiment that starts a second bubbly episode and the economy expands again. This economy
therefore experiences a macroeconomic ﬂuctuations that are driven solely by investor sentiment
shocks. Despite its simplicity, this example shows that introducing these shocks into quantitative
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Figure 5
In Figure 5, the eﬀects of bubbly episodes are transitory because the economy is stationary.
This is due to diminishing returns, i.e. capital accumulation makes capital abundant and lowers
its average product. Bubbly episodes would have long-lasting eﬀects, however, if the economy were
non-stationary. To illustrate this, in the appendix we generalize the production structure of the
economy and allow for constant or increasing returns to capital accumulation. In particular, we
assume that the ﬁnal good is produced by assembling a continuum of intermediate inputs. The
presence of ﬁxed costs then creates a market-size eﬀect, i.e. capital accumulation increases the
21number of intermediate inputs and this raises the average product of capital. We ﬁnd that output
is yt = k
α  
t ; where the parameters α < 1 and   > 1 reﬂect these two opposing forces. If diminishing
returns are strong and market-size eﬀects are weak, i.e. α     < 1, capital accumulation lowers the
average product of capital and the economy is stationary. If instead diminishing returns are weak
and market-size eﬀects are strong, i.e. α     ≥ 1, capital accumulation raises the average product
of capital and the economy is non-stationary. Interestingly, this generalization does not aﬀect the
conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes in Propositions 1 and 2.30 It does however make it
possible for transitory bubbly episodes to have permanent eﬀects. We illustrate this in the appendix
with the help of an example in which a bubbly episode takes the economy out of a negative-growth
trap. Even though the bubbly episode ends, the path of the economy has changed forever.
4 Where is the market for bubbles?
We have developed a stylized model of economic growth with bubbles. In this model, a ﬁnancial
friction impedes productive investors to borrow from unproductive ones. When the market for
bubbles is closed, each investor is forced to invest his/her own resources. As a result, the average
eﬃciency of investment, the capital stock and output are all low. When the market for bubbles
opens, productive investors sell bubbles to unproductive ones. This reallocation of resources raises
the average eﬃciency of investment, the capital stock and output. Thus, ﬂuctuations in activity
in the market for bubbles create macroeconomic ﬂuctuations even in the absence of fundamental
shocks to preferences and technology. But, where is the market for bubbles in real economies? We
show next that the transactions performed in the market for bubbles can be replicated with the
help of stock and credit markets.
Consider an economy with the same preferences and technology as the benchmark economy of
sections 2 and 3. In this modiﬁed economy there is no market for bubbles and instead we have
stock and credit markets. In particular, we make the following assumptions:
1. Production and investment must take place within ﬁrms that are owned and managed by
entrepreneurs. The young can become entrepreneurs by purchasing pre-existing ﬁrms in the
stock market or by creating new ones at zero cost. Let vt denote the value of the stock market,
i.e. the price of all pre-existing ﬁrms.
30Moreover, it has only minor eﬀects on the formal structure of the model: Equations (6) and (7) remain the same
while, in Equation (11), the exponents of kt become α     instead of α.
222. The productivity of a ﬁrm is that of its entrepreneur. In particular, ﬁrms owned and managed
by productive entrepreneurs have an investment eﬃciency of one, while ﬁrms owned and
managed by unproductive ones have an investment eﬃciency of δ. Let vPt
t and vUt
t be the price
of all ﬁrms owned and managed by productive and unproductive entrepreneurs of generation
t, respectively. Naturally, vPt
t + vUt
t = vt.
3. Entrepreneurs can obtain credit to purchase their ﬁrms and/or to invest in them. But en-
trepreneurs cannot pledge the output of their ﬁrms to their creditors.31 Since capital fully
depreciates in production, entrepreneurs can only pledge an empty ﬁrm as collateral to their
creditors. Credit contracts last for one period and specify an ex-post payment in each possible
history. These payments cannot exceed the price of the entrepreneur’s empty ﬁrm.
A diﬀerence between this modiﬁed economy and the benchmark economy of sections 2 and 3 is
that now individuals have access to three savings options rather than two: (i) purchasing ﬁrms in
the stock market; (ii) building capital within these ﬁrms or within new ﬁrms created at zero cost;
and (iii) becoming a lender in the credit market.32 Since the labor market is still assumed to be
competitive, the wage equals the marginal product of labor as given by Equation (1). And this






δ   α   kα−1
t+1 if i ∈ Ut
α   kα−1
t+1 if i ∈ Pt
(14)
where RK
i,t+1 is the return to investment in the ﬁrm owned and managed by individual i. Consistent
with our assumptions, Equation (14) says that this return varies across investors. Let Rt+1 be the
average ex-post return on credit contracts (option (iii))). Since individuals are risk neutral, all
contracts must oﬀer the same expected return. We refer to this required expected return as the
interest rate. Equilibrium in the credit market requires that the interest rate satisfy the following
31That is, we assume that old entrepreneurs can appropriate the ﬁrm’s entire output net of wage payments. Utility
maximization ensures that they will indeed choose to do so regardless of whatever they might have promised in their
youth.
32Let vit denote the value of pre-existing ﬁrms owned by individual i ∈ It in period t, respectively. Let fit be the
credit obtained by individual i. We can write the intertemporal budget constraint of individual i:
cit+1 = rt+1   Ai   (wt + fit − vit) + vit+1 − Rt+1   fit,
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To understand Equation (15), recall ﬁrst that the only collateral that productive ﬁrms can pledge





that, after purchasing their ﬁrms, unproductive individuals are left with an amount of funds equal
to (1 − ε)   s   kα
t − vUt
t that can be used to invest in their ﬁrms or to give credit to productive
ﬁrms. With these two observations at hand, it is straightforward to see that the three segments of
Equation (15) describe three diﬀerent situations relating these two quantities.
Assume ﬁrst that the collateral of productive ﬁrms falls short of these available funds when the
interest rate equals the return to unproductive investments:
EtvPt
t+1
(1 − ε)   s   kα
t − vUt
t
< δ   α   kα−1
t+1 .
Then, collateral is so scarce and credit constraints so tight that productive ﬁrms cannot absorb all
available funds for investment. As a result, some investments take place in unproductive ﬁrms and
the interest rate indeed equals the return to unproductive investments.
Assume instead that the collateral of productive ﬁrms falls short of available funds when the
interest rate equals the return to productive investments, but it exceeds available funds if the interest




(1 − ε)   s   kα
t − vUt
t
≤ α   kα−1
t+1 .
Then, the interest rate is such that it makes the credit constraint just binding. Collateral is suﬃcient
to ensure that productive ﬁrms absorb all available funds for investment. But it is not suﬃcient to
allow competition among productive ﬁrms until the interest rate equals the return to productive
investments.
Assume ﬁnally that the collateral of productive ﬁrms exceeds available funds when the interest




(1 − ε)   s   kα
t − vUt
t
. Then, the interest
rate equals the return to productive investments. Collateral is now enough to allow productive
ﬁrms to absorb all the available funds for investment and to compete among themselves until the
interest equals the return to productive investments.
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The formal similarity between Equations (5) and (16) is not a coincidence. Indeed, the predictions
of the modiﬁed and benchmark models for quantities and welfare are seen to be equivalent if33













This equivalence follows from the observation that ﬁrms bundle together capital and bubbles. Since
the output of a ﬁrm cannot be pledged to creditors, its market price only reﬂects the bubbles this
ﬁrm owns, i.e. bt = vt.34 It is therefore in the stock market that the old sell their bubbles to
the young. When a new entrepreneur adds additional bubbles to the ﬁrm, this is reﬂected in













t > 0. If this bubble creation takes place in an unproductive ﬁrm, the entrepreneur
is happy to hold this value until old age and use it then to ﬁnance additional consumption. If this
bubble creation takes place in a productive ﬁrm, the entrepreneur might want to borrow against this
value and de facto sell the new bubbles to the ﬁrm’s creditors. This would be the case if collateral
is low or intermediate and the return to productive investments exceeds the interest rate. It is
therefore in the credit market that the productive young sell their new bubbles to the unproductive
young. All the equilibria of the benchmark model studied in section 3 can now be re-interpreted
as equilibria of the modiﬁed model, in which the transactions in the market for bubbles take place
in the stock and credit markets. It is important to stress that no new ﬁrms need to be created in








34This amounts to assuming that credit backed by bubbles is less prone to agency costs and asymmetric information
problems than credit backed by physical output or by capital. This seems like a reasonable assumption, though.
In general, agency costs increase with the manager’s ability to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s value and decrease with the
shareholders’ ability to observe the actions of the manager. The output of a ﬁrm depends on its capital stock and
on how it is managed, and it is likely to be inﬂuenced by managers through a variety of channels that are diﬃcult
to observe. The value of a bubble depends instead on the expectations of a rational market, which are unlikely to
be inﬂuenced by the actions of a manager unless the market decided to use the manager as a sunspot to coordinate
these expectations. Even in this case, it seems unlikely the manager could exploit this ability to his/her advantage
without the shareholders knowing it.
25these equilibria, so that changes in bt = vt reﬂect changes in the price of all ﬁrms but also in the
price of the average ﬁrm.
This re-interpretation of our model connects the abstract theory presented here with the evi-
dence reported in Figure 1. The onset of a bubbly episode is characterized by a large an unexpected
increase in stock and real estate prices.35 This raises wealth or net worth providing productive en-
trepreneurs with enough collateral to borrow and invest. Thus, the average eﬃciency of the economy
increases and so does the capital stock and output. Interestingly, this happens at the same time
as the interest rate declines. Throughout the bubbly episode, the stock and real estate markets
outgrow the interest rate and consumption and welfare are both high.36 Eventually, the bubbly
episode ends and asset prices collapse. This leads to a collapse in wealth and net worth, which
reduces collateral and hampers intermediation. The average eﬃciency of investment declines and
this leads a to a contraction in the capital stock and output. The result is a decline in consump-
tion and welfare. This description of events seems broadly consistent with the US and Japanese
experiences.37
This re-interpretation of our model also connects the theory of rational bubbles with the theory
of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The former stresses that asset prices can experience booms and busts
even in the absence of shocks to fundamentals, while the latter stresses the importance of asset
prices for determining credit and macroeconomic activity. Both ideas are central here and we
think that combining them will be crucial for understanding recent macroeconomic history. In
ongoing work, Carvalho et al. (2011), we develop a quantitative model of the ﬁnancial accelerator
with rational bubbles.38 This quantitative model contains a much more sophisticated and realistic
description of preferences and demography, and cannot be analyzed with the simple analytical
methods we have used here. Business cycles are driven by two types of shocks: fundamental shocks
that aﬀect technology and preferences; and investor sentiment shocks that lead to the appearance
and collapse of bubbles in ﬁnancial markets. Our immediate goal is to calibrate the model with
data from industrialized economies and use it to explore the relative importance of both types of
shocks in recent macroeconomic history.
35Very little would change in the model of this section if we relabeled ﬁrms as real estate.
36During the bubbly episode, the price of the average ﬁrm (or real estate unit) outgrows the interest rate due to
the risk of the bubble bursting and to bubble creation.
37Of course, although quatitatively similar, not all bubbly episodes need to be exactly alike. In a richer model with
individuals and ﬁnancial intermediaries, for example, the impact of a bubbly episode on macroeconomic aggregates
might depend on the identity of agents holding the bubble. This possibility, which has been invoked to account for
the severity of the last recession, provides an exciting avenue for future research.
38Kosuke and Nikolov (2011) also explore the implications of bubbles in a quantitative macroeconomic model.
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295 Appendix: the model with endogenous growth
Assume that the production of the ﬁnal good consists of assembling a continuum of intermediate
inputs, indexed by m ∈ [0,mt] according to a symmetric CES function:













where qtm denotes units of the variety m of intermediate inputs and   > 1. The constant λ =
( )
−  (1− ) −1 is a normalization parameter. Final-good producers are competitive. Production
of intermediate inputs entails variable and ﬁxed costs:
qtm = (ltm,v)







1−α   (ktm,f)
a if qtm > 0
0 if qtm = 0
, (20)
where ftm is the ﬁxed cost and ltm,v, ltm,f, ktm,v and ktm,f are the labor and capital, variable and
ﬁxed costs of producing variety m. Input varieties become obsolete in one generation and, as a
result, all generations must incur the ﬁxed costs. The production of intermediate inputs takes place
under under monopolistic competition and free entry.
This production structure is a special case of that considered by Ventura (2005). He shows that,
under the assumptions made, the output of the economy is given by yt = k
α  
t , whereas competition
in factor markets implies that wt = (1 − α)   k
α  
t and rt = α   k
α  −1
t .We can generalize Equations
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30The only diﬀerence with the model in the main text lies in the exponents of kt, which are now α  
instead of α. It is easy to verify that this generalization of the production structure does not aﬀect
the conditions for the existence of bubbly episodes, as Propositions 1 and 2 apply for any value of
 . To see this, re-deﬁne xt ≡
bt
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, and check that Equations
(6) and (7) still apply.
When α     ≥ 1, even transitory bubbly episodes can have permanent eﬀects on the levels and
growth rates of capital and output. Figure A1 illustrates this. The left panel depicts the case of
an expansionary bubble. Initially, the economy is in the fundamental state and the appropriate
law of motion is kF
t+1. Initially, the capital stock is below the fundamental steady state, i.e. kt <
kF ≡ (s   A)
1
1−α  , and growth is negative. This economy is caught in a “negative-growth trap”.
When an expansionary bubble pops up, it reduces unproductive investments and uses part of these
resources to increase productive investments. During the bubbly episode, the law of motion of
capital lies above kF
t+1: in the ﬁgure, kB
t+1 represents the initial law of motion when the episode
begins. Throughout the episode, kB
t+1 may shift as the bubble grows or shrinks. Growth may be
positive if, during the bubbly episode, the capital stock lies above its steady-state value. Eventually,
the bubble bursts but the economy might keep on growing if the capital stock at the time of
bursting exceeds kF. The bubbly episode, though temporary, leads the economy out of the negative-
growth trap and it has a permanent eﬀect on long-run growth. Naturally, it is also possible for
contractionary bubbles to lead the economy into a negative growth trap thereby having permanent
negative eﬀects on growth: the right panel of Figure A1 shows this possibility.
  kt￿1
kt
kt￿1
F kt￿1
B
kF kBkt
kt￿1
kt
kt￿1
F kt￿1
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Figure A1
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